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THE PRESENT SUPREME COURT, SOCIAL LEGISLATION
AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS*

JEFF B. FoRmH.M

"

A little over twenty years ago Dean Pound penned an article
on liberty of contract for the Yate Law Journal. His development
of the subject, which brought the artificial character of the concept most effectively under the spotlight of analysis led to the
conclusion that the courts had in this regard come to be looked
upon with increasing distrust as the guardians of class interests.
In the decade, 1910-1920, it seemed that the Supreme Court was
out to vindicate itself as a liberal and impartial bench. But in
the decade just passed a number of decisions adverse to social
legislation induced the belief that Mr. Chief Justice Taft's Court
was predominently conservative. Today with two new justices
upon the Court it may not be amiss to consider the prospects for
the future.
Recurring to the doctrine of liberty of contract one finds that
at this day as a result of repeated adjudications the most liberal
judges on the bench have been compelled to acknowledge its legal
force in our system of constitutional law.' Historically the case
is not so clear. So far at least as the idea of personal liberty is
involved liberty of contract is a comparatively new concept.8 The
idea seems to have gained most of its force from individualistic
notions of the sanctity of private property.
The English idea of the right to personal liberty has certainly
never been so inclusive. In the words of Dicey: "The right to
personal liberty as understood in England means in substance a
person's right not to be subjected to imprisonment, arrest or other
physical coercion in any manner that does not admit of legal
justification."' We derived the concept from the English and
*The substance of this article is taken from a paper of the same title prepared under a Sterling Research Fellowship in the Yale Law School.
.*Assistant Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
(1909) 18 YALE L. J.454.
2
Brown, Due Process, Police Power and the Supreme Court, (1927) 40 ARV.
L. REv. 943, 949. It is not intended to suggest that Mr. Justice Holmes, for
example, attributes any great significance to the phrase, established precedents notwithstanding. He is concerned with the adjustment of clashes between individual and public interests. It is with respect to this social problem
that liberty of contract has meaning for him.
3 See Pound, Zoo. cit. supra n. 1, at 482 et seq.
&DioEy, THE LAw oF THE CoNswrurTON, (6th ed. 1902) 203-204.
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there is little reason to believe that the framers of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments put any greater content into the term,
liberty, than the English idea of freedom from physical restraint.'
That function remained for a minority element of the Supreme
Court composed of Mr. Justice Bradley, Mr. Justice Field and
Mr. Justice Harlan to whom the individualistic concepts of liberty
and property were key principles of our jurisprudence. Mr.
Justice Peckham came in for a share of glory in the triumph of the
doctrine.!
The primary development of which liberty of contract is one
branch has been the application of the due process clause as a
test of the constitutionality of statutes in the domain of substantive
law. Here again a case can be made that this application of a
phrase is unhistorical.' The very phrase itself suggests formal
procedural matters. Mr. Justice Brandeis has stated the situation:
"Despite arguments to the contrary which had seemed to me persuasive, it is settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to matters of substantive law as well as to
matters of procedure. Thus all fundamental rights comprised
within the term liberty are protected by the Federal Constitution
from invasion by the states."'
It is likely that the courts would have found some other constitutional provision under which to test the validity of substantive
legislation had the due process clause never been drafted for the
purpose. In his dissenting opinion in the Slaughter House Cases'
Mr. Justice Bradley made an argument that the legislation in
question violated the privileges and immunities clause.
These developments have been outlined in order to suggest
the eitreme importance of the factor of judicial personnel in cases
rCertainly when the Fifth Amendment was drafted American society was so
far untouched by any such force as the industrial revolution as to have
conditions to suggest any such concept as the liberty of contract of Mr. Justice
Field. And the Fourteenth Amendment was, it appears, directed at concrete
issues of the day as well as the rendering of the first eight amendments applicable to the states. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT,
(3908), 94; cited by Brown, Zoo. cit. supra n. 2, at 946.
OThe triumph of the doctrine was embodied in the case of Lochner v. New
York, 198 U. S. 45, 29 S. Ct. 539, 3 Ann. Cas. 1113 (1905). The antecedent
development is suggested by Professor Felix Frankfurter in his article, Mr.
Justice Holmes and the Constitution, (1927) 41 HARv. L. B.EV. 121, at 141-142,
and footnote 50.
7 See Corwin, Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, (1911) 24 HMW.
L. REV. 372-374.
8'Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 373, 47 S. Ct. 641 (1927). See also
note (1928) 28 CoL. L. REV. 619.
0 16 Wall. 36, 112 et seq., 21 L. ed. 394 (1872).
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involving constitutional questions. There is probably no single
case which better illustrates this point than the famous minimum
wage case." Professor Thomas Reed Powell has demonstrated
that only the fortuitous course of events prevented there being five
members at the time favorable to minimum wage legislation.'
The position of the Supreme Court in cases involving social
legislation has become increasingly difficult as the social problems
of modern legislatures have become more complex and more knotty.
The state legislatures necessarily must engage in a form of social
experimentation in attempting to adjust problems peculiar to
modern conditions. They have fact-finding agencies and facilities
to aid them in estimating a supposed evil and planning its eradication. Their members come directly from the people at large and
often are personally familiar with the conditions sought to be
remedied. Courts, on the other hand, are not investigators. They
simply decide controversies as presented by the parties. Moreover, primary questions of policy are not considered to be within
the judicial perview. One would suppose that such considerations
might be calculated to render a court unwilling to declare a
statute unconstitutional except in the clearest sort of case. The
position of the courts is a difficult one even were this supposition
entirely reliable. With the power of judicial review they are the
ultimate arbiters in balancing class interests as well as particular
interests.
The old notion that competition is the life of trade still lives
on in the minds of legislators and judges as a fundamental economic truth. We have legislative props to support an economic
theory the very import of which denies the need of such support,
that is, the competitive system is theoretically self-regulatory.
Moreover, along with anti-trust laws and the judicial disapproval
thereunder of private agreements to boost prices on the one hand
we have on the other governmental agencies actively buying wheat
on the market in order to maintain prices. The administration
operates consistently under no one economic theory in these matters. Naturally there is a difference of opinion upon great economic questions. What is to be deprecated here is the fact that
judges often neglect to consider a statute independently of their
personal economic views and infuse them into their opinions as
"Adkins v. Childrens' Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 S. Ct. 394, 24 A. L. R.
1258 (1923).
"Powell, Judicialty of Minimum Wage Legislation, (1924) 37 HArv. L.
REv. 545.
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though, for instance, the Constitution ordains the competitive system.
And yet all are agreed that no matter what economic system
seems to them ideal there is a point where a business becomes of
sufficient public concern that it may be subjected even to price
regulation. Just when a business takes on such a character is an
inquiry to which no certain criteria have been attached." In the
first place some judges consider the inquiry itself a judicial one
while others recognize therein -what is primarily a function of the
legislative body.
The very phrase, affected with a public interest, only suggests legal consequences and renders little assistance in settling
a given case. This is illustrated most effectively by the attitudes
of several of our Supreme Court Justices toward the phrase. In
Williams v. Standard Oil Company? in which it was held that the
business of selling gasoline was not so affected with a public
interest as to justify governmental price fixing Mr. Justice
Sutherland in his majority opinion felt called upon to define the
phrase. He stated that it means "that a business or property, in
order to be affected with a public interest, must be such or be so
employed as to justify the conclusion that it has been devoted to a
public use and its use thereby in effect granted to the public".
This was a repetition of his definition in the Tyson case," which
he formed by rephrasing a statement made by Mr. Chief Justice
Waite in Munn v. Illinois.? His own language is the best criticism
of his definition. "This phrase, first used by Lord Hale 200 years
ago it is true, furnishes at best an indefinite standard and attempts
to define it have resulted generally, in producing paraphrases,
which themselves require elucidation. 1 We await the elucidation.
Mr. Justice Holmes, on the other hand, does not take this set
of words so seriously as to undertake the task of defining it. In
his dissent in the Tyson case he asserted that "the notion that a
business is clothed with a public use is little more than a fiction
1See Hamilton, Affectation with a Public Interest, (1930) 39 YALE L. J.
1089; McAllister, Lord Hale and Business Affected with a Public Interest,
(1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 759.
278 U. S. 235, 239-240, 49 S. Ct. 115 (1929).
1" Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 434, 47 S. Ct. 426 (1927).
Tyson v. Banton, supra n. 14 at 273 U. S. 430.
94 U. S. 113, 126 (1876).
"When, therefore, one devotes his property
to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public
an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the
common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created."
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intended to beautify what is disagreeable to the sufferers. The
truth seems to me to be that, subject to compensation where compensation is due, the legislature may restrict or forbid any business when it has a sufficient force of public opinion behind it".'
This fires the imagination but it remained for Mr. Justice Stone
calmly to dispose of the phrase. He too found the Tyson case an
occasion to attack the expression.' He said: "The phrase 'business
affected with a public interest' seems to me too vague and illusory
to carry us far on the way to a solution. . . . To say that only
those businesses affected with a public interest may be regulated
is but another way of stating that all businesses which may be
regulated are affected with a public interest". Mr. Justice Stone
would draw his criterion from past decisions. "An examination
of the decisions of this Court in which price regulation has been
upheld will disclose that the element common to all is the evidence
of a situation or combination of circumstances materially restricting the regulative force of competition, so that buyers or sellers
are placed at such a disadvantage in the bargaining struggle that
serious economic consequences result to a very large number of
members of the community."'"
In the latest case before the Court Mr. Justice Brandeis,
writing the opinion of the Court, relied upon the factor of
monopoly in upholding the regulation of the rates of marketing
agencies in the Omaha Stockyards&' But he ,did not insist that
this would be an essential factor in every case. He, in fact, passed
over the matter of the public character of the business with little
comment to devote most of his discussion to the procedural aspects
of the case. This may tend to explain the fact the case was decided
by a unanimous court and suggest that Mr. Justice Brandeis
is more concerned with results than with language.
It is just where courts are faced with questions of this sort
that the factor of judicial personnel in the decision of cases is
most important. It is believed that only in a secondary sense ought
judges to participate in formulating matters of policy but this
function makes a heavy demand upon judicial statesmanship. One
may reasonably expect that the social and economic views of most
judges influence their votes in this sort of case. Each-new case
17Tyson v. Banton, swpra n. 14, at 273 U. S. 446.
'9Tbid, at 451.
10 Ibid, at 451-452.
'9Tagg Bros. and Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 50 S. Ct. 220

(1930).
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more nearly stands upon its own bottom than is the situation in
any other branch of our jurisprudence. There is a correspondingly greater want of certainty in the law, that insistent desideratum
of the business world. If one would predict what the Court would
decide upon a given state of facts within the present field, which
business of -prediction is the everyday function of the lawyer, he
should consider the implications of the factor of judicial personnel.
In the following pages it will be sought without any effort to
ransack the minds of the judges to gather from their opinions
some conception of the way they severally approach the decision of
constitutional cases involving legislation of a more than common
social character.
I
No case affords a better starting block, as it were, than that
of Burns Baking Company v. Bryan.' It alone almost suffices to
present the approaches of MIr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice
Butler. A Nebraska statute provided that every loaf of bread
made for purpose of sale, or offered for sale in the state should
weigh one-half pound, one pound, a pound and a half, or exact
multiples of one pound. Loaves of any other weights were prohibited but a tolerance of two ounces in excess of the standard
weights was allowed. Whether the standard was satisfied was to
be ascertained from the average weight of any twenty-five loaves,
which was not to exceed the maximum or be less than the minimum weights. This was an action by four bakers and a retail
grocer against the Governor and Secretary of State to enjoin the
enforcement of the act on the ground that it violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the majority opinion Mir. Justice Butler stated the problem,
significantly enough, to be this: "Constitutional protection having
been invoked, it is the duty of the court to determine whether the
challenged provision has reasonable relation to the protection of
purchasers of bread against fraud by short weights and really
tends to accomplish the purpose for which it was enacted." It
will be observed that this statement declares the judicial function
to extend to the primary consideration of the policy of the statute,
in short, to decide the case upon the basis of its own opinion as
to the reasonableness and appropriateness of the statute.
-264

U. S. 504, 44 S. Ct. 412, 32 A. L. R. 661 (1924).
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Upon considering the evidence as preserved in the record the
learned Justice found that variable factors in the baking of bread
rendered the exact weight of loaves of bread beyond the control of
bakers without the use of waxed papers as wrappers. But the act
was not a sanitary measure and there existed a strong demand
for unwrapped bread. Unwrapped bread, he asserted, was a
wholesome article of food. Therefore, it was unreasonable to require, in effect, that bread be wrapped in order to effect the purpose of the act, the prevention of fraud as to the weight of bread.
His next step was to conclude that the statute was not calculated to effect its object since there was no evidence of any deception and it was contrary to human experience that there should
be any deception as to the weight of a loaf of bread. This last
assumption, of course, assumes the whole answer to the question
before the Court and is inconsistent with the Schmidinger case,'
which Mir. Justice Butler approved. If it were unreasonable to
assume that there could be any deception as to the weight of bread
then the statute failed even of a proper object.
Mr. Justice Butler's point that the act was not a sanitary
measure was especially neat but not so sound. It is a matter of
common knowledge that most bakers wrap their bread, which tends
to show that to require all to do so would be no very great burden.
If the purpose of the statute was a proper subject of legislative
action, as the Supreme Court had previously decided in the
Schmidinger case, it would seem that the legislature might resort
to any not too onerous means to effect its purpose.
In dissenting Mr. Justice Brandeis did not undertake to decide whether the statute was reasonable but concerned himself with
whether "the prohibition of excess weights could reasonably be
deemed necessary". Though insisting that there was ample
evidence in the record to sustain the statute he declared that in
cases of this character the Court should not feel itself confined to
the record but should feel free to resort as by judicial notice to any
relevant data tending to present the situation which evoked the
legislation in question and the accrued actual and experimental
Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U. S. 538, 33 S. Ct. 182, Ann. Cas. 1914B,
284 (1913). A Chicago ordinance provided that every loaf of bread made
or procured for the purpose of sale or sold in the city should weigh one
pound. Sales could be made in half, one and one-half, double, triple, quadruple, quintuple and sextuple loaves and no other way. Every loaf was to
bear a label giving its weight and specifying whether it was standard size.
The ordinance was upheld despite the fact that it caused considerable inconvenience to the bakers.
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experience of the public and specialists therewith. And following
this tack he collected much data and made footnote references to
more which included reports and opinions, official and unofficial,
as well as the experience of Nebraska and other states with the
problem attacked by the statute. This data convinced him that the
legislature might reasonably have believed that the excess weight
provision not overburdensome with respect to the object of the
statute and reasonably conducive to that end.
In the Schmidinger case the Supreme Court had upheld a
minimum weight provision in a Chicago ordinance. Mr. Justice
Brandeis here relied upon that case as an authority. He found
that the maximum weight provision was aimed to prevent the
selling of an overweight loaf of one standard size as a loaf of
a heavier standard and further that experience showqd that the
prohibition of excess weights was an administrative necessity to the
prevention of short weights. The majority opinion here simply
cited the Schmidinger case for the proposition that the police
power may be exerted "to protect purchasers from imposition by
sale of short weight loaves" and passed it by.
Mr. Justice Brandeis concluded his opinion with the following pertinent observation upon the action of the majority: "To
decide as a fact that the prohibition of excess weights 'is not
necessary for the protection of the purchasers against imposition
and fraud by short weights'; that it 'is not calculated to effect that
purlose'; and that it 'subjects bakers and sellers of bread' to heavy
burdens, is, in my opinion, an exercise of the powers of a superlegislative-not the performance of the constitutional function of
judicial review." This searching criticism relates to the nature
of the judicial process in the function of judicial review. A word
should be devoted to the content of that doctrine before we proceed.
The conception of judicial review embodied in the Brandeis
opinion in the baking company case might be called the classical
conception thereof. No one has given it more effective and able
expression than James B. Thayer.' In his words the function of
the courts in judicial review is thus set forth:
"If their duty was in truth merely and nakedly to ascertain the meaning of the text of the constitution and of the
impeached Act of the legislature, and to determine, as an
OSee his article, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, (1893) 7 HA.v. L. Rsv. 129.
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academic question, whether in the court's judgment the two
were in conflict, it would, to be sure, be an elevated and important office, one dealing with great matters, involving large
public considerations, but yet a function far simpler than it
really is. Having ascertained all this, yet there remains a
question-the really momentous question-whether, after all,
the court can disregard the Act. It cannot do this as a mere
matter of course--merely because it is concluded that upon a
just and true construction the law is unconstitutional. That
is precisely the significance of the rule of administration that
the courts lay down. It can only disregard the Act when
those who have the right to make laws have not merely made
a mistake, bri-t have made a very clear one,--so clear that it
is not op2n to rational question."'
As so conceived judicial review is not a matter of a court
giving its own opinion directly as to the validity of legislative
action but is the secondary function of deciding whether the
legislature might reasonably have deemed its action constitutional.
This view Thayer applied to judicial review of the acts of coordinate departments. With respect to a paramount authority
reviewing the acts of a department not co-ordinate, as would be
the case of a federal court considering the validity of a state
statute under the federal constitution, however, he conceived that
the court must rely upon its own opinion as to constitutionality in
order to allow the federal constitution nothing Iess than its just
and true interpretation. At this juncture we would part with
Thayer to follow Mr. Justice Holmes, who makes no such distinction.' It is believed that this distinction at best should be limited
to the constitutional questions arising in connection with the distribution of governmental powers between the federal and state
governments. This would leave cases arising under the Fourteenth
Amendment within the general principle. They do not involve the
paramount authority of the federal government.
Recurring to the approach of Mr. Justice Butler we find a
more recent case in which he seems to give effect to the classical
conception of judicial review. Highland v. Russell Car Company"
involved the validity of the provisions of the Lever Act authorizing
the President to fix the price of coal during the war. The statute
was upheld under the war power. Mr. Justice Butler asserted:
"the measures here challenged are supported by a strong presump- Ibid, at 143-144.
5 See, for example, his rather too farreaching language in disenting in
Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U. S. 402, at 415, 46 S. Ct. 320 (1926).
279 U. S. 253, 49 S. Ct. 314 (1929).
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tion of validity, and they may not be set aside unless clearly shown
to be arbitrary and repugnant to the Constitution." He pointed
out that the price which the President had set had not been shown
to be less than the price at which coal was subject to requisition by
the government. Then followed the disappointing conclusion that
the act could, therefore, be deemed to have deprived the plaintiff
coal dealer only of the opportunity to sell his coal for more than
it was worth, as if coal or any other commodity had any intrinsic
value. This is an interesting sidelight upon the economic views
of the spokesman.
As in the Burns Baking case so in Di Santo v. PeonnsylvaniaF
the majority was represented by Mr. Justice Butler and the
minority by Mr. Justice Brandeis. Here one gets a view of Mr.
Justice Butler's matter-of-fact, syllogistic method of disposing of
cases involving the commerce clause of the federal Constitution.
He conceives that all direct state burdens upon interstate or foreign
commerce are invalid, inquires in the given case simply whether
there has been such a direct burden imposed and, if he so finds,
proceeds to the conclusion that the state action is invalid. In
the Di Santo case the defendant was indicted for violating a
Pennsylvania statute, which required those engaging in the sale
of steamship tickets first to procure a license, to make publication
of application for licenses, to give proof of good moral character
and to give bond in the penal sum of $1,000 against fraud or misrepresentation to purchasers. Mr. Justice Butler in a terse opinion
found the statute to be a direct burden upon foreign commerce,
which, of course, settled the case under his view of the law.' Selling passenger steamship tickets is a well known part of foreign
commerce. This statute operated directly to interfere with this
business and thus with foreign commerce. The fact that it was a
police measure to prevent fraud was immaterial. Congress has
complete authority to regulate foreign commerce and thus is the
proper body to act in that regard.
In dissenting Mr. Justice Brandeis recognized the major
premise of the majority, that a state may not directly burden
foreign commerce, as a statement of the applicable rule. But he
had a different notion of the content of those words. He first
noticed the purpose of the act, to protect people of small means,
273 U. S. 34, 47 S. Ct. 267 (1927).
It is worthy of note that Mr. Justice Butler had occasion to urge these
views as counsel in the Mlinnesota rate cases, 230 U. S. 352, 33 L. ed. 729
(1913).
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largely immigrants, who were the prey of predatory steamship
ticket agents. The statute was, then, a police measure not sought
to regulate foreign commerce. The transaction immediately regulated, the purchase of steamship tickets was an intra-state affair,
as much so as a purchase of land. Foreign commerce was, thus,
affected indirectly only. Attention was directed to instances in
which more marked interferences with interstate or foreign commerce by state police regulation had been upheld. Though Congress could have acted it had not "occupied the field". Moreover, the law was proper state action as an inspection law. As for
a case cited by the majority as a controlling precedent he insisted
that the doctrine of stare decisis did not command that the court
err a second time and that in the construction of a different
statute. In such matters as drawing the line between federal and
state authority over commerce the process is one of trial and error.
And mistaken decisions should not be followed. "In the case at
bar .... the logic of words should yield to the logic of realities".'
In this manner did he obviate the result of a rigid application
of a verbal formula; he gave that formula a meaning consistent
with facts, the facts which invoke legislation and upon which it
is to operate. He applied, in effect, the idea which Mr. Justice
Stone proceeded to set out expressly, namely, that the test of the
majority was too mechanical, a legal conclusion rather than a
formula by which it is reached, which should give way to the inquiry whether upon all the circumstances the interference is of
peculiarly local concern not infringing freedom of commerce.
Social problems require what is at best sort of experimentation by
legislatures. There is not necessarily a best way or only one
proper way. This factor of trial and error, thinks Judge Brandeis,
should not be disregarded by the courts.
Again Mr. Justice Butler spoke for the majority and Mr.
Justice Brandeis registered a dissenting vote in the case of
Quaker City Cab Company v. Pennsylvania.' A Pennsylvania
statute imposed a tax upon the gross receipts of transportation
companies from business done wholly within the state. No such
tax was imposed upon individuals or partnerships engaged in the
same business as were competitors of the defendant cab company.
In the state court the State recovered the tax due under the terms
of the statute. Mr. Justice Butler was evidently pleased with
20 Supra n. 26, at 273 U. S. 42-43.
277 U. S. 389, 48 S. Ot. 553 (1928).
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the argument of Mr. Owen J. Roberts, of counsel for defendant,
since the line of his reasoning is traceable in the opinion of the
Court. It was reasoned that the tax was not of a character peculiar
to corporations such as are capital stock taxes but the classification
was based solely upon the character of the persons taxed. "The
discrimination is not justified by any difference in the source of
the receipts or in the situation or character of the property employed". The conclusion was that the tax violated the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The classification was decried in no uncertain terms. "In no view can it be
held to have more than an arbitrary basis." The writer would
submit that the very advantages of the corporate form of doing
liusiness might have been deemed a reasonable basis for classification. A corporation is nothing more than a convenient device for
the purposes of its members. They are the parties in interest. The
statute simply put an added tax upon persons doing the business
in question when they chose to do it under the corporate form. A
state might abolish the corporate form entirely for the future if it
saw fit.
Mr. Justice Brandeis noticed this distinction. After stating
the minimum requirement of the Constitution, that the classification be reasonable, that is, "one" which an informed, intelligent,
just-minded, civilized man could rationally favor", he pointed out
that it was rather customary to discriminate unfavorably against
corporations in tax matters. The form of the tax, he urged, was
immaterial. The amount of this tax might with facility have been
included in a correspondingly swollen franchise tax. So he concluded in true Hohnsian fashion that there was nothing in the
Constitution forbidding the discrimination.
It is not to be supposed upon the basis of the cases discussed
above without looking further that Mr. Justice Brandeis is incapable of a legalistic opinion. As a matter of fact he is quite an
artist at that character of judicial composition. It is one of his
tools, so to speak. Thus he will insist upon jurisdictional deficiencies on occasion while Mr. Justice Holmes is dissenting upon the
-merits, as in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia.' Moreover, he is
adept at distinguishing past decisions invoked as precedents.'
- 262 U. S. 553, 43 S. Ct. 658 (1923).
Notice the case of Bedford Cut Stone Co. v.
Ass'n., 274 U. S. 37, 47 S. Ct. 522 (1927). In
Justice Brandeis distinguishes the earlier case
Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 41 S. Ct. 172, 16
particular nicety.

Journeymen Stone Cutters'
his dissenting opinion Mr.
of Duplex Printing Press
A. L. R. 196 (1921) with
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As for his economic views his opinions and votes as a member
of the Court would classify him neither as an antagonist of big
business' nor one indifferent to the situation of the little fellow.'
It is true that his great zeal to see justice done renders him sympathetic to the situation of those who feel the crush of economic
oppression. Only in this sense could it be said that he takes sides.
He is not opposed to large-scale capitalistic enterprise per se. He
is not a laissez-fairephilosopher. Rather does he speak the language
of modern economists who sense the place of public agencies of
regulation and control in the present industrial order.
Mr. Justice Butler, so far as his opinions indicate, is simply
representative of the older, more legalistic school of judges. He
has adhered to that economic individualism which is the rational
handmaid of big business. And his opinions evince a firm belief
in federal supremacy. The writer would venture to conclude that
both he and M11r. Justice Brandeis are pragmatists, but to different
ends.
II
The short period which has elapsed since Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes ascended to his place at the head of the bench has not been
too short to throw some light on his judicial work from the standpoint of the present inquiry. Before examining opinions written
' In the American Column and Lumber Co. case, 257 U. S. 377, 42 S. Ct.
114, 21 A. L. R. 1093 (1921) we find him dissenting in behalf of the legality
of trade associations under the anti-trust laws. In probably the two decisions
of the Court most liberal to monopoly, those in United State v. United
States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417, 40 S. Ct. 293, 8 A. L. R. 1121 (1920)
and United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U. S. 32, 38 S. Ct.
473 (1917) neither Mr. Justice Braneis nor Mr. Justice Stone took any
part.
"In upholding what the writer would term a secondary boycott, but
which Mr. Justice Brandeis would not so denominate, he expressed himself
as follows in dissenting in the Bedford Stone Cutters' case: "The Sherman
Law was held in United States v. United States Steel Corp. to permit capitalists to combine in a single corporation 50 per cent of the steel industry
of the United States, dominating the trade through its vast resources. The
Sherman Law was held in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co. to
permit capitalists to combine in another corporation practically the whole
shoe machinery industry of the country, necessarily giving it a position of
dominance over shoe-manufacturing in America. It would, indeed, be
strange if Congress had by the same act willed to deny members of a small
craft of workingmen the right to co-operate in simply refraining from work,
when that course was the only means of self-protection against a combination of militant and powerful employers. I cannot believe that Congress
did so."
In these remarks one senses a strong sympathy for the underdog. Mr.
Justice Brandeis did not participate in the Steel Corporation case because
he had expressed an opinion in the matter before the case arose.
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by him as Chief Justice consideration should be given to his career
as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court from October 10,
1910 till June 10, 1916.
It will be recalkd that in the debate in the Senate over the
confirmation of the Chief Justice objection was made that he was
a conservative and one who as a lawyer had served as guardian of
the interests of big business. It must be granted at once that a
man's professional associations may be expected to have some influence upon his economic and social views. But it is scarcely
arguable that the years of corporation practice which followed the
tenure of the present Chief Justice as Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court have so remolded his views as to render reference
to his earlier judicial career valueless. The fact that he has
served as an executive officer of the federal government is a reminder that he knows the point of view of the political branches
of the government as well as the non-political branch.
During the period, October 10, 1910 till June 10, 1916 the
Supreme Court decided 210 cases involving the due process clause
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. This includes every type
of due process question. In 28 of these cases it was held that due
process had been denied. Of these cases only 13 may be said to
have involved social legislation. And in only one of the entire
210 did Mr. Justice Hughes dissent. He concurred in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Day in Coppage v. Kansas,' wherein it
was decided that a Kansas statute prohibiting yellow dog contracts
was an unconstitutional impairment of freedom of contract. In
only two of these 28 cases did Mr. Justice Hughes write the opinion
of the Court and in both instances the question related to alleged
confiscatory railroad rates.'
None of the cases in which social legislation was invalidated
except the Coppage case were of very wide significance and eight
were of quite narrow scope. Four of them involved a Kentucky
anti-trust law, which, as construed by the state court, made illegal
combinations entered into for the purpose of controlling prices
with the effect of fixing a price greater or less than the real value
of the comnmodity.' The statute was held invalid for uncertainty
=236 U. S. 1, 35 S. Ct. 240 (1915).
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. North Dakota, 236 U. S. 585, 35 S.
N
Ct. 429, L. R. A. 1915F, 748 (1915); Norfolk and Western Ry. Co. v. Con]ey, 236 U. S. 605,.35 S. Ct. 437 (1915).
It was Mr. Justice Hughes who
wrote the opinion of the Court in the Minnesota rate cases, supra, n. 28.
'1 Internatiopal Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 216, 34 S. Ct. 853
(1915) ; International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 589, 34 S. Ct. 944
(1914); Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 634, S. Ct. 924 (1914); Malone v.
Kentucky, 234 U. S. 639, 34 S. Ct. 926 (1914).
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since there was no standard set up by which to ascertain what
prices would have been had there been no combination and thus
parties could not know when they were violating the law.' , The
decision has no bearing upon the merits of anti-trust legislation
in general. The nature of the remaining four cases is suggested
in the footnote.'
On the other hand there were many notable decisions upholding social legislation in this period. Space permits footnote reference only to the bulk of them.' It may fairly be said that the
period was one during which the Court was favorably disposed toward social legislation when much legislation of that character
was presented to it for review.
The opinion in the oft-cited McGuire case was written by Mr.
Justice Hughes." An Iowa statute abolishing the fellow-servant
rule as to railroad companies provided that in no case should a
International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 216, 34 S. Ct. 853
(1914).
30 Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Danaher, 238 U. S. 482,
35 S. Ct. 886 (1915). A statute construed to authorize the imposition of a
penalty upon a telephone company for refusing service to patrons who
were in arrears for past services was held to take property without due
process of law. The opinion by Mr. Justice Van Devanter is quite a good
one. In N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U. S. 149, 34 S. Ct. 879 (1914)
a Missouri statute providing against forfeiture of insurance policies for
default in premiums or loans made against policies was held unconsitutional
as applied to policy contracts entered into in New York by nonresidents.
The same result was reached in a case of the same caption involving the
same statute. 234 U. S. 166, 34 S. Ct. 883 (1914). A Texas statute making it a misdemeanor to serve as a conductor on a railroad train without
having served for two years as a freight conductor or as a brakeman was
found to violate the liberty of contract of those who had not had the
experience required by the statute in Smith v. Texas, 233 U. S. 630, 34
S. Ct. 681 (1914).
10They include Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 31 S. Ct. 186
(1911), (compulsory guaranty by banks of deposits); German Alliance
Ins. Co. v. Hale, 219 U. S. 307, 31 S. Ct. 246 (1911), (public fixing of
insurance rates); Schmidinger v. Chicago, supra n. 21, (fixing by ordinance
the size of loaves of bread); Riley v. Massachusetts, 233 U. S. 571, 34 S.
Ct. 469 (1914), (maximum hours for women set by statute penalizing their
employment at other times than that posted in a conspicuous place);
Keokeo Consol. Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U. S. 224, 34 S. Ct. 856 (1914),
(requiring wage orders to be redeemable in money); Rail and River Coal
Co. v. Yaple, 236 U. S. 338, 35 S. Ct. 359 (1915), (anti-screen law requiring
payment of wages of miners to be based on weight of coal before sifting);
Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138, 35 S. Ct. 142 (1914), (game law
making possession of firearms by aliens unlawful); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.
S. 373, 35 S. Ct. 342 (1915), (eight hour day for women); Heim v. McCall, 239
U. S. 175, 36 S. Ct. 78 (1916), (statute preferring New York citizens as
workers in contruction of public works); Erie R. Co. v. Williams, 233 U. S.
685, 34 S. Ct. 766 (1914), (statute requiring semi-monthly payment of wages
of railway workers).
"Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 31 S. Ct. 259 (1911).
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railroad plead as a defense to an action under the statute any
benefit or insurance relief contract entered into before the date
of the injury. In this action by an employee arising out of injuries
received in the course of his employment the statute was invoked
to preclude the defendant company from pleading the acceptance
by plaintiff of benefits from its relief department. Mr. Justice
Hughes granted at once that liberty of contract in the sense of the
absence of arbitrary restraint and not absolute liberty was
guaranteed by the Constitution. Turning to the decisions he
adduced a general principle, that legislative action is bad if
arbitrary and without reasonable relation to a purpose government
is competent to effect. Conceiving that there was no question but
that the state might abrogate the common law fellow-servant rule
he found it a ready step to conclude that the legislature had power
to forbid any contracts in derogation of the statute. This is the
argument t.at where there is power to do an act there is also the
incidental power to do those things necessary to render that act
effective. The approach to the question was an entirely abstract
inquiry as to the power of the legislature to enact the challenged
statute.
With respect to the function of the courts in these cases Mr.
Justice Hughes had this to say:
"Where there is a reasonable relation to an object within
the governmental authority, the exercise of the legislative discretion is not subject to judicial review. The scope of judicial
inquiry concerning the question of power is not to be confused with the scope of legislative considerations in dealing
with the matter of policy. Whether the enactment is wise or
unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether
it is the best means to achieve the desired result, whether, in
short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits
should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the
judgment of the legislature, and the earnest conflict of serious
opinion does not suffice to bring them within the range of
judicial cognizance."
This passage has been lately justly criticized." The learned
justice no doubt meant not that a statute is not subject to judicial
review unless it has no reasonable relation to a proper purpose
but that it is subject to adverse judicial action only where it has
no reasonable relation to a proper legislative object. Obviously
a court must review a statute in order to ascertain in the first
place whether it might reasonably be deemed by the legislature a
4'Note (1930) CoL. L. REv. 360, 363.
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proper means to effect a legislative end. The language used is
unfortunate, to say the least. It was not entirely accurate to say
that in judicial review courts are not concerned with the policy of
legislation but only with the power of the legislature to enact it.
In considering the question of power the inquiry is not an abstract
one of the construction of a written instrument but the marking
out of outer bounds of the range of legislative action. This cannot be done without considering, in a secondary capacity it is true,
the social basis and policy of particular enactments.
In Price v. Illinois the Supreme Court was concerned with
the validity of an Illinois statute which prohibited the use of boric
acid in fruit preservatives. Mr. Justice Hughes wrote the opinion
of the Court upholding the statute. He declared that to overthrow
the statute it must appear that it be an arbitrary interference with
the property and liberty of the citizen. "It is plainly not enough
that the subject should be regarded as debatable. If it be debatable, the legislature is entitled to its own judgment, and that judgment is not to be superseded by the verdict of a jury upon the
issue which the legislature has decided." This statement marks
an adherence to the classical conception of judicial review.
The M Guire opinion is, as suggested, an abstract inquiry into legislative power. There was no searching of the factual background of the legislation. And yet by a strictly legalistic approach
what is generally conceived to be a desirable result was reached.
Another legalistic opinion of the present Chief Justice sheds
light upon his views, as of 1911 at least, of the federal anti-trust
laws. In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park and Sons
Co." the Supreme Court held that resale price-fixing with respect to patent medicines violated the Sherman Act and was a common law restraint of trade as well. In speaking for the majority
Mr. Justice Hughes first noticed the contention that since a manufacturer was not compelled to produce at all he might fix the resale price of his product when he did produce. This, he thought,
was a non sequitur since a seller might not impose upon a purchaser any restraint he sees fit. Whatever right the manufacturer
had did not depend upon his original ownership but upon contract. The validity of the contract was based upon the familiar
test of its reasonableness with respect to the interests of the parties
sought to be protected and the interest of the public at large,
'238 U. S. 446, 35 S. Ct. 892 (1915).
"220 U. S. 373, 31 S. Ct. 376 (1911).
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Here if dealers had by
quoting from a famous English case.
agreement with each other adopted the same price restriction as
fixed by the manufacturer thereby achieving the same result such
would have been unlawful price-fixing as settled by authority.
From this it was reasoned that the manufacturer's resale pricefixing agreement with dealers could "fare no better". So followed
the conclusion: "The complainant having sold its product at prices
satisfactory to itself, the public is entitled to whatever advantage
may be derived from competition in the subsequent traffic."
This clever but unreal chain of reasoning may well be contrasted with the analysis of Mr. Justice Holmes, who dissented.
He supposed that the right of one to fix the resale price of a
single isolated article would hardly be denied. But the fact that
there was a general scheme of resale price-fixing with the object
of fixing the market price was not enough to render the contract
unquestionably bad. By the simple device of making dealers agents
in law as well as in fact the manufacturer could effect his purpose
without danger of successful attack. This being so why attack
the device used. The force of the agency suggestion has since been
demonstrated in the General Electric case" in which Mr. Chief
Justice Taft swallowed it either deliberately or by the hook and
sinker method, since at all events the arrangement in question was
upheld as an agency. Mr. Justice Holmes, who concurred in that
case, did not concern himself with objecting to the reasoning of
the Court, no doubt since he was satisfied with the result in favor
of resale price-fixing.
In the instant case the following remarks from him are
peculiarly revealing and equally as effective:
"I think that we greatly exaggerate the value and importance to the public of competition in the production or distribution of an article as fixing a fair price. What really
fixes that is the competition of conflicting desires. We, none
of us, can have as much as we want of all the things that we
want. Therefore we have to choose. As soon as the price of
something that we want goes above the point at which we are
willing to give up other things to have that, we cease to buy
it and buy something else. Of course, I am speaking of things
that we can get along without. There may be necessaries that
sooner or later must be dealt with like short ration in a shipwreck, but they are not Dr. Miles's Medicines. With regard to
things like the latter, it seems to me that the point of most
"Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Gun Co., (1894) App. Cas. 565.
"U. S. v. General Elec. Co., 272 U. S. 476, 47 S. Ct. 192 (1926).
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profitable returns marks the equilibrium of social desires, and
determine the fair price in the only sense that I can find
meaning in those words ..... I see nothing to warrant my
assuming that the public will not be served best by the company being allowed to carry out its plan. I cannot believe
that in the long run the public will profit by this court permitting knaves to cut reasonable prices for some ulterior purpose of their own, and thus to impair, if not to destroy, the
production and sale of articles which it is assumed to be desirable that the public should be able to get."'
This passage leaves no one in doubt about the views of the
writer on resale price-fixing. The application of the term, knaves,
to price-cutters is strong language. But whether one agrees with
the economic views of Mr. Justice Holmes or not, it is submitted
that his opinion is more satisfying than that of the majority. Instead of simply assuming that resale price-fixing is not opposed to
the public interest he suggested considerations which led him to
that conclusion. Mr. Justice Brandeis would probably have gone
farther to assemble statistical data in support of his conclusion
had he been writing an opinion in the case.
On March 12, 1930 the Supreme Court decided that the provision of the Ohio Constitution requiring a vote of six to one by
the members of the State Supreme Court to overthrow a statute as
unconsitutional was not a denial of due process or equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment." The opinion of the Court was
rendered by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes. The case was not a difficult one since, as pointed out in the opinion, a right of appeal is
not essential to due process. But the case reflects an important
development, the constitutional limitation of judicial review."9
In another case readily disposed of the Chief Justice spoke
for the Court in favor of a Louisiana statute providing free school
books for all school children, whether pupils in public or private
schools.' The state court found the statute one in aid of the school
children and not the schools in which they were instructed. Adopt"7At 220 U. S. 412.
3State of Ohio ez rel. Bryant v. Akron Metrop. Park Dist., 281 U. S.
74, 50 S. Ct. 228 (1930).
"oThe device embodied in the Oldo Constitution to limit judicial review
was discussed by Mr. Justice Stone in an address before the American Bar
Association, Fifty Years Worlk of the United States Supreme Court, (1928)
14 A. B. A. JouR. 428, 8 ORE. L. REv. 248. And see the address of Attorney
General Lee of West Virginia before the State Bar Association evincing
great anxiety over this idea, Badicalism and the Constitution, REPORTS OF
THE WEST VIRGINIA BAR AssociATioN (1930), p. 273, 287 et seq.
I Cocluan v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 U. S.371, 50 S.Ct.
335 (1930).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1931

19

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [1931], Art. 4

PRESENT SUPREME COURT
ing this interpretation the Supreme Court upheld the conclusion
of the state court that the purpose of the appropriation was a publie one, public education, and not for the benefit of private parties
as objected by taxpayers.
In Corporation Commission of Oklalwma v. Lowen Lowe had
obtained an injunction in the court below restraining the Commission from issuing a license to the Farmers Union Cooperative Gin
Company to construct and operate a cotton gin at P. Under
statute cooperatives such as the gin company were empowered to
apportion certain of the profits of their business among the patron
members according to the amount of their sales to and purchases
from the company. The directors, if authorized by the by-laws
might allow non-members to participate in this part of the profits
on a similar basis as members. Lowe contended that these provisions enabled the cooperative to carry on business on more favorable terms than he could as operator of a ginning business since
the company would be compelled to grant rebates to its patron
members, though a public utility, while he was prohibited from
making rebates. In short, he insisted that he had been deprived of
the equal protection of the la w's. It was true that the ginning business was a public utility in Oklahoma. Rates were fixed by the
defendant Commission.
Upon the oral argument counsel for the Commission contended
that under the law of the state Lowe was not prohibited from
making rebates. They argued, moreover, that the authorized
profit distribution was not a rebate. Lowe was unable to show that
the law of Oklahoma denied him the privilege granted the cooperatives. On this basis the Court, in an opinion by the present Chief
Justice, decided that Lowe had not made out his contention that he
had been deprived of the equal protection of the law. It was
deemed unnecessary to consider the question whether the privilege
granted the co-operative was a privilege to make rebates.2 The
281 U. S. 431, 50 S. Ct. 396 (1930).
The reasoning in the case is misconceived in the discussion by GRAoRy
HANIaX

AiD CHARLOTTE HANKIN,

PROGRESS

OF THE LAW IN THE

U. S.

1929-1930, pp. 112 et seq. The authors are quite accurate,
however, in indicating that assuming equality of legal privilege the cooperative would still have a distinct economic advantage particularly by reason
of greater ability to raise capital through a sort of customer ownership.
But this is no greater objection to the validity of the law that an objection
that the corporate form of doing business deprives individual competitors
of equal protection by reason of economic inequality. An ordinary business
corporation could legally do what the cooperative was allowed to do in this
case and no one would be so hardy as to say that this denied equal protection to competing individuals.
SUPREME COURT,
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controlling question was-did Oklahoma law permit Lowe to distribute his net profits in the same manner as the co-operative ?
This simple disposition of the case, hinging on a flaw in the
oral argument of counsel, may appear extremely legalistic. But
it is believed justifiable in view of the result effected. The Oklahoma co-operative ginning experiment was saved. In the Frost
case * Mr. Chief Justice Taft's court, over the strenuous dissent of
Mr. Justice Brandeis on the merits, had held unconstitutional a
section of the same statute, which exempted co-operative ginners
from the requirement of a certificate of convenience and necessity
for obtaining a license to do business. The majority had there relied on the ground that the co-operative was in business for profit
and thus there was no acceptable basis for discrimination. In
the Lowe case had the Court by judicial notice found that the accepted principle of public utility law that rebates are illegal obtained in Oklahoma, though there was no Oklahoma decision or
statute directly in point, the whole difficulty in the Frost case
would have been encountered again. There can be no serious doubt
that the privilege granted was to make rebates. The question on
the merits would, then, have been whether the discrimination as to
this privilege was justifiable and proper. If fought out on the
merits before the Supreme Court there would have been some doubt
about the outcome in view of the Frost case. So, the writer believes, the decision of the court is commendable even though involving a resort to a legalistic, device, which dispensed with consideration of the important problems presented on the merits.
The most striking utterance of the new Chief Justice for
our purpose was provoked by the case of Texas and New Orleans
Railroad Company v. Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship
Clerks.'
The plaintiff Brotherhood had been authorized by a majority
of the clerks of defendant company to represent them in all matters relating to their employment. The bill charged that while a
controversy between the present parties over wages was pending
before the United States Board of Mediation in 1925 the defendant
caused a company union to be formed and sought to intimidate
and coerce members of the Brotherhood to shift their allegiance to
the company union. The bill prayed an injunction against this
r* Frost v. Corp. Com'm of Okla., 278 U. S. 515, 49 S. Ct. 235 (1929).
U. S. 548, 50 S. Ct. 427 (1930). The reported decisions in the
courts below are cited in the opinion.
t281
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sort of activity on the strength of the Railway Labor Act of 1926,"
which in terms requires the amicable settlement, if possible, of all
industrial disputes of interstate carriers in conference by representatives of the company and the employees. For this purpose,
it is declared, representatives shall be designated "without interference, influence, or coercion exercised by either party over the"
self-organization or designation of representatives by the other".'
A temporary injunction was granted. The company thereafter
recognized the alleged company union as the representative of the
clerks and dealt with it accordingly. In civil contempt proceedings the company was ordered to purge itself by disestablishing
the company union, reinstating the Brotherhood as the employee
representative until the clerks should by secret ballot under court
direction designate new representatives and, further, re-employing
employees who had been discharged because of union activity. On
final hearing the injunction was made permanent and the contempt
decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals.
On
certiorari to that court the Supreme Court upheld the decree.
As to the fact of the intimidation and coercion the Chief
Justice relied on the findings of the two lower courts under the
rule that findings concurred in by two courts will be accepted unless clearly in error, which was not the case here in the face of a
strong motive of the company, the avoiding of a wage increase.
The legal question considered was whether the Railway Labor Act
imposed a duty on the company enforceable by judicial proceedings. With great clarity the Chief Justice pointed out the legislative steps which led to the Act of 1926 in the effort to effect
amicable settlement of railway labor disputes. Like former efforts
this statute set up a voluntary scheme of arbitration but went
further by "buttressing" it with definite legal obligations. Thus
an award is made conclusive and binding and a qualification is
attached to the right to strike.' And here though the affirmative
duty to effect an amicable adjustment "may be of imperfect obligation because not enforceable in terms a definite statutory prohibition of conduct which would thwart the declared purpose of the

"45
§ 152.

U. S. C. A. (1926), 1930 Cumi. ANN. POCKET PART, C. 8.

See esp.

'§ 152, par. 3.
"In case of a failure to adjust a dispute amicably the President is authorized on notification by the Board of Mediation of a threatened "tie-up"
to appoint an emergency investigating board. The Act, § 160, forbids the
parties to change the status quo for thirty days after the board has reported
except by agreement, thus limiting the right to strike.
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legislation cannot be disregarded". Intimidation and coercion preventing free choice of representatives would defeat the statutory
scheme. Moreover, the prohibition was enforceable. Therefore,
enforcement must have been contemplated by Congress. The
power to make the prohibition was derived from the commerce
clause. Under it Congress may act to protect or advance interstate commerce, which authority would include the fostering of
settlements of disputes threatening "tie-ups" of interstate transportation. Finally, if the requirement of the Clayton Act that injunctions be granted in labor disputes only to protect property
rights was applicable it was satisfied in this case.'
By direct legal argument aided only by a calm examination of
the legislative purpose Mr. Chief Justice Hughes did all that a
"sociological jurist" could do to warm the hearts of so-called
liberals. The opinion is reminiscent of Chief Justice Marchall with
its well-turned generalizations, which pave the way to a logical
disposition of the case at hand.
In this case seven justices? without dissent attached a real
modification to the notion of liberty of contract. For purposes
of the Railway Labor Act an employer was forced to re-employ
clerks who had been discharged in the course of conduct by the
company opposed to the policy of the statute. The opinion distinguished the Adair and Coppage cases," which were fatal to
statutes attempting to invalidate yellow dog contracts, on the
ground that the Act of 1926 does not interfere with an employer's
normal exercise of his right to hire and discharge particular individuals. But the decree here qualified this right for the protection of the right of labor to organize for purposes of collective
bargaining under the Act of 1926 and it was this same right to
organize, though for broader purposes, that was offered protection
in the legislation overthrown in the Adair and Coppage cases.
There is a suggestion that this result is "the natural culmination of
No doubt the swing has been
recent developments in labor law.'
that way. But the more important factor, probably, was judicial
personnel. Of the seven judges sitting on the case at least four
would have been expected to vote as they did. The other three may
'As to the nature of the interest as a subject of equitable cognizance
see International News Service v. The Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 39
S. Ct. 68 (1918). The point is not one of primary interest here.
, Mr. Justice McReynolds did not participate.
sOAdair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 28 S. Ct. 277 (1908); Coppage
v. Kansas, supra n. 35.

'-Note

(1930) 30 YALE L. J. 92.
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not have been troubled by the liberty of contract objection since it
related to the decree and not the statute. In any event the significant fact is the increased strength given to the workers in collective
bargaining. They now have a right against their employer to organize for purposes of the Railway Labor Act entirely unmolested
even by such measures as the discharging of individual workers.
Though Mr. Chief Justice Hughes is probably less philosophical than some of the known liberals upon the Supreme Court, is
less a student of the social data behind legislation than Mr. Justice
Brandeis and Mr. Justice Stone and has a rather legalistic outlook upon constitutional questions there is nothing in his judicial
record to require that he be classified as a reactionary or a
champion of vested interests. He is a more dominating personality
than his immediate predecessor and thus his outlook is particularly
important in this regard. It is believed that he will continue to
set a liberal pace for the Court.
III
The judicial technique of Mr. Justice Sutherland may be considered comparatively with that of Mr. Justice Stone since they
have in several important cases represented the majority and
minority views on the bench respectively.
Mr. Justice Sutherland is generally regarded as the very
epitome of conservative sentiment on the bench. Probably more
than any of his fellows he is held in the sway of the old abstract
legalistic method. Several writers have called attention to the rea&
'
soning by analogy in the majority opinion in Ribnik v. McBride.
In the Tyson case the Court had held price-fixing legislation relating to the commissions of ticket brokers unconstitutional. Employment agencies also did a brokerage business. It seemed to Mr.
Justice Sutherland, therefore, that if one type of brokerage business was a private enterprise not subject to governmental price
regulation that went for all of them. ' To Mr. Justice Stone ticket
brokers and employment brokers were similiar only in name.'
It will not be sought here to reagitate ground already plowed
and replowed. But one further reference to the Ribnik case may
"Hamilton, Zoo. cit. mupra n. 12; note (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 225; McAllister, Zoc. cit. supra n. 12, at 786-787.
0'Mr. McAllister points out that this reasoning would be expected to have
led Mr. Justice Sutherland to have dissented in Tagg Bros. and Moorhead
v. United States, supra n. 20. But the decision was rendered by a unanimous
court.
0'
Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 373, 48 S. Ct. 545 (1928).
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be warranted in this connection. Having decided that an employment agency is engaged in a private business Ir. Justice Sutherland was not further concerned with the conditions that evoked
the New Jersey statute in question. Thus he wrote: "To urge that
extortion, fraud, imposition, discrimination and the like have been
practiced to some, or to a great, extent in connection with the
business here under consideration, or that the business is one lending itself peculiarly to such evils, is simply to restate grounds already fully considered by this Court. These are grounds for regulation but not for price-fixing, as we have already definitely decided. "" In this fashion did he state, in effect, that New Jersey
could not resort to the only sort of regulation which its legislature
found adequate to the purpose. But the attempted distinction between price-fixing and other types of regulation did not satisfy
Mr. Justice Stone. His answer was devastatingly put. He declared: "I cannot accept as valid the distinction on which the
opinion of the majority seems necessarily to depend, that
granted constitutional power to regulate there is any controlling
difference between reasonable regulation of price, if appropriate
to the evil to be remedied, and other forms of appropriate regulation which curtail liberty of contract or the use and enjoyment of
To him it seemed obvious that "the Constitution does
property.'
not require us to hold that a business subject to every other form
of reasonable regulation, is immune from the requirement of reasonable prices, where that requirement is the only remedy appropriate to the evils encountered. In this respect I can see no difference between a reasonable regulation of price and a reasonable
regulation of the use of property, which affects its price or economic return.'
Consider the reasoning of Mr. Justice Sutherland in Williams
v. Staizdard Oil Company.' A Tennessee statute providing for
government regulation of the price of gasoline was challenged as
a violation of due process of law. By assuming a minor premise he
reduced the problem to very simple terms. Gasoline, he stated,
was a commodity of trade differing in no essential respect, so far
as the question before the Court was concerned, from many other
common articles of trade. Past decisions supplied the major
premise, that these other common articles of trade were not within
Ibid, at 358.
Ibid, at 373.
Ibid.
07Supra m. 13.
'
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the comprehension of the phrase, affected with a public interest.
It followed as the night the day (or vice versa) that the selling of
gasoline was not a business affected with a public interest. Mr.
Justice Holmes dissented while Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr.
Justice Stone concurred in the result.
Certainly the case does seem to be so clear a one for the
statute as was true of the Ribnik case, where the legislature, as
fully indicated in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stone,
was faced with serious evils affecting the daily employment of
many of the people of the state. Such evils were not paralleled
in this case. However, simply to assume the answer to the whole
problem is not very satisfying. One would like to know just what
it was that placed the selling of gasoline in the category of business not subject to public price regulation beyond a shadow of a
doubt.
It appears that Mr. Justice Sutherland has demonstrated
that he can write an opinion in which he treats local legislation
with liberality. In Euclid v. Ambler' we find him writing the
opinion of the Court in a case in which the liberal group on the
The Court upheld a comprehensive zoning
bench prevailed.'
ordinance which went so far as to mark out the building districts
of a city so as to create an exclusively residential area. The
following excerpt from the opinion indicates that the writer is not
unimpressed on occasion with the importance of social considerations in the judicial process in such cases. The passage has received approving quotation by Mr. Justice Stone in an address
before the American Bar Association."
"Building zone laws are of modern origin. They began
in this country about twenty-five years ago. Until recent
years urban life was comparatively simple; but with the great
increase and concentration of population, problems have developed, and constantly are developing, which require and will
continue to require, additional restrictions in respect of the
use and occupation of private lands in urban communities.
Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of which, as
applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are
now uniformly sustained, a century ago, probably would have
been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. Such regulations
are sustained, under the complex conditions of our day, for
272 U. S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114 (1926).
Mr. Justice Van Devanter, Mr. Justice McReynolds
Butler dissented without opinion.
0Loc. cit. supra n. 35, at 14 A. B. A. JOUR. 432.
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reasons analogous to those which justify traffic regulations,
which, before the advent of automobiles and rapid transit
street railways, would have been condemned as fatally
arbitrary and unreasonable. And in this there is no inconsistency, for while the meaning of constitutional guaranties
never varies, the scope of their application must expand or
contract to meet the new and different conditions which are
constantly coming within the field of their operation. In a
changing world it is impossible that it should be otherwise.'
But there follows the too-revealing statement: "But although
a degree of elasticity thus imparted, not to the meaning, but to
the application of constitutional principles, statutes and ordinances, which, after giving due weight to the new conditions, are
found clearly not to conform to the Constitution, of course, must
fall."
In this opinion the spokesman seems to have resorted to the
methodology of the "liberals". He considered the social background of zoning legislation, lie used the extra-legal material of
commissions and experts and went so far as to suggest considerations which might be deemed to satisfy the Constitution. But even
here one gets the impression that the conception of law as a body of
principles imbued with meaning apart from any social data on
which laws operate still has the approval of Mr. Justice Sutherland.
Such is the implication, to say the least, of the last sentence of the
above passage.
Mr. Justice Stone is inclined to march directly to the task of
demonstrating how a challenged statute can be upheld as constitutional as does Mr. Justice Brandeis but unlike Mr. Justice
Holmes, who goes no farther than to satisfy himself that the statute
is not unconstitutional, a much lower hurdle for the challenged
enactment. Like Mr. Justice Brandeis he overleaps the record in
a case if necessary to 'gain a full picture of the setting of a statute.
One observes with interest the practice they pursue of annotating
their opinions with reference to materials uncovered, at least in
large part, in their researches in preparing opinions. This stress
upon the facts in constitutional cases is characteristic of Mr.
Justice Stone.2 It is he who has recommended the establishment
71272 U. S. 365, at 386-387. See also Zahn v. Board of Public Works of
Los Angeles, 274 U. S. 325, 47 S. Ct. 594 (1927); Nectow v. Cambridge,
277 U. S. 183, 48 S. Ct. 447 (1928) (ordinance held invalid).
72The factual element in constitutional cases has received some secondary consideration. Bilke, Questions of Fact Affecting Constitutionality (1924) 38
L av. L. Ray. 6; note (1980) 30 COL. L. REv. 360.
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of a research service in Washington in aid of the Supreme Court
comparable to legislative research bureaus. Consider the following remarks of the learned Justice delivered in a recent address:
"Lawyers who in the presentation of a negligence case,
would prove with meticulous care every fact surrounding the
accident and injury, in this field too often go little beyond
the challenged statute and the citation of authorities in supposedly analogous cases. The court is thus often left to speculate as to the nature and extent of the social problems giving
rise to the legislative problem, or to discover them by its own researches. Intimate acquaintance with every aspect of the conditions which have given rise to the regulatory problems are
infinitely more important to the courts than are the citation
of authorities or the recital of bare formulas.""
The brief of Mr. Justice Brandeis as counsel in Muller v. Oregon1 '
is known as a model brief of the sort for which his fellow justice
was making a plea here.
The opinions of Mr. Justice Stone are notable for their direct.
ness and clarity of statement. Although he shares the reluctance
of some of his brothers on the bench to consider a constitutional
question simply to vindicate an abstract right,' when he does speak
he does not mince matters. Miller v. Schoene' involved the validity
of a Virginia statute requiring the destruction of cedar trees within a radius of two miles of any apple orchard upon a finding by
the state entomologist that such trees were infected with cedar
rust, a disease destructive of the fruit and foliage of apple trees.
Appellant's ornamental cedar trees were ordered destroyed under
the authority of this statute. Counsel insisted that the operation
of the statute amounted to the bald taking of one man's property
for the benefit of that of another. The statute as construed by
the state court did not allow compensation for trees destroyed.
One has only to drive through western Virginia to see that the
growing of apples is one of her principal industries.
Loc. cit. supra n. 35, at 14 A. B. A. JouR. 433.
7'Brandeis, Brief for Defendant in Error, Muller v. Oregon, U. S. Sup.
Ct., Oct. Term, 1907, no. 107.
- See his dissent in Frost v. Corporation Commission, "spran. 52a. Under
Oklahoma law only co-operative associations could obtain licenses to do a
ginning business without a showing of public convenience and necessity. The
plaintiff having already procured a license and conducted business sought
to enjoin the issuance of a license to a co-operative association. Mr. Justice
Stone made the point that since plaintiff already had his license he was not
injured by the statute and should not be allowed to complain of a discrimination. Injury sustained through increase in competition would be damnum
absque injuria. This reasoning is persuasive.
276 U. S. 272, 48 S. Ct. 246 (1928).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol37/iss2/4

28

Fordham: The Present Supreme Court, Social Legislation and the Judicial Pr

WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
3&r. Justice Stone wrote the opinion of the Court upholding
the statute. He viewed the situation as one where the state was
compelled to make a choice between preserving one or the other
class of private property. Because of the importance of the applegrowing industry in Virginia there was a preponderant public interest in the preservation of apple orchards which removed the
case from the class of conflicts of merely private interests. The
legislature remained within constitutional bounds when it decided
upon the destruction of one class of property in order to save
another it deemed of the greater importance to the public. This
simple and effective opinion speaks for itself. The only surprising
thing about the case is that there were no dissents.
To Mr. Justice Stone legal distinctions are differences of degree only. This belief, is, no doubt, one factor which impels him
to give the full benefit of the doubt to challenged legislation.
Thus he is averse to overthrowing a statute as violative of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment where the
classification depends upon peculiar conditions better known to
the legislature. In Clarke v. DeckebaclJ a city ordinance prohibi'ting the operation of pool rooms by aliens was in question. Mr.
Justice Stone thought the legislative body entitled to some latitude in appraising local evils and making a choice of methods to
combat them. "It was competent for the city to make such a
choice, not shown to be irrational, by excluding from the conduct
of a dubious business an entire class rather than its objectionable
members selected by more empirical methods." In the opinion of
the writer this judge is setting a fine standard of judicial statesmanship in his approach to modern constitutional questions.
IV
Little may be said concerning the judicial methodology of Mr.
Justice Van Devanter in the field of social legislation for the reason that he has written few opinions in that neck of the legal
woods. During the five years since Mr. Justice Stone moved up
from the post of Attorney-General his brother Van Devanter has
written only two opinions involving constitutional questions of the
character treated herein. And in one of these, the opinion of the
Court in Chas. Wolff Packing (o. v. The Court of Industrial
Relations of Kansas," he was simply in large part following the
' 274 U. S. 392, 47 S. Ot. 630 (1927).
S267 U. S. 555, 45 S. Ct. 441 (1925).
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trail blazed by the Chief Justice in a case involving the same
parties and wherein the decision was unfavorable to the Kansas
industrial court experiment." The other case is one of considerable
interest for its own sake.
In the case of New York ex rel Bryant v. Zimmerrnai Bryant
was seeking a writ of habeas corpus to test the lawfulness of his
detention for violation of a New York statute. It was urged that
the statute was in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment. The
statute embodied the New York effort to uncloak the Ku Klux
Klan. It provided that oathbound associations other than labor
unions and benevolent societies should file with the secretary of
state a sworn copy of their constitutions, by-laws, rules, regulations and oaths of membership and rosters of their members and
officers. To become a member or remain in the membership of
such an order with knowledge that it was violating the publicity
provisions of the statute was made a misdemeanor. This was the
offense with which relator was charged.
With respect to the publicity provisions of the statute under
the due process clause Mr. Justice Van Devanter simply stated the
theory of the statute, that if the public record was made as required it would constitute a deterrent to violations of public and
private right to which secret orders are tempted, and concluded
that the "requirement is not arbitrary or oppressive, but reasonable and likely to be of real effect". Granting the power to compel disclosure there existed, of course, the incidental power to punish members conniving at a failure to disclose. Thus he disposed
of the due process question by a mere resort to formulae. He
practically assumed his answer. But his treatment of the equal
protection problem was more searching. Relator complained that
the statute did not extend to labor unions and benevolent societies.
First Mr. Justice Van Devanter gathered formulae from opinions
in past cases such as Patsone v. Pennsylvania.' Next he noted the
differences upon which the statute was based, which had been
marked by the courts below. Among these were the tendency of
the Ku Klux Klan, for example, to use secrecy as a cloak for
terrorism. At this point he turned to facts concerning such organizations as the Klan and thereby gave body to his opinion. He
assumed that the legislature had had before it the report of a
'9262 U. S. 522, 43 S. Ct. 630 (1923).
278 U. S. 63, 49 S. Ct. 61 (1928).
81Sapra n. 40.
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Congressional Committee on the Klan when it framed the statute
and then proceeded to the background of the order and its violent
prejudices against certain elements in the community. These matters convinced him that there was a "real and substantial basis"
for the classification. He did not limit himself to saying that the
legislature might reasonably have so found but so found himself
though this was beyond the requirements of judicial action in the
case.
It would appear that as regards interstate commerce Mr.
Justice Van Devanter follows the general formula of Mr. Justice
Butler-if a state statute imposes a direct burden upon interstate
commerce it is invalid. The well-known case of Pennsylvania v.
West Virginia!' is illustrative. A West Virginia statute required,
in effect, that the local demand for natural gas be satisfied before
any should be piped across the state line into neighboring states.
It appeared that the natural supply of gas in West Virginia would
not last very much longer and already the demand so exceeded
production that the statute would necessarily operate to cut down
the amount of gas piped into Ohio and Pennsylvania. These two
states brought suit to enjoin the enforcement of the act alleging
that irreparable damage would result to their citizens and to many
of their public eleemosynary institutions which relied upon the
gas for heat and light if the statute were enforced.
After graphically stating the circumstances which evoked the
statute Mr. Justice Van Devanter proceeded to find that the case
presented a justiciable controversy since both the complaining
states represented substantial interests, those of their consuming
publics and the interests of certain of their public institutions.
He then attacked the principal inquiry-whether the statute was
an unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce. "A state
law, whether of the state where the gas is produced or that where
it is to be sold which by its necessary operation prevents, obstructs
or burdens such transmission is a regulation of interstate commerce,-a prohibited interference. The West Virginia Act is such
a law". Though the pipe line companies were public service companies of West Virginia they might not be compelled to furnish
service in West Virginia to the subordination of their interstate
business. He dismissed the contention that the act was simply a
measure to conserve natural resources for the benefit of the citizens of the state with a quotation from the opinion of the Court
"Supra n. 31.
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in West v. Kansas Natural Gas Company,' wherein it was stated
that were the contention to prevail all the states might place embargoes upon their distinctive natural products and thus freeze
interstate commerce therein.
Mr. Justice Holmes waxed quite legalistic in his dissent. His
contention that a state might regulate its products until they are
actually started upon their way to a point beyond its borders is
reminiscent of the view of the Court in United States v. E. C.
Knight and Company' that a combination of sugar manufacturers
whose plants were all located in Pennsylvania but who, of course,
sold sugar in interstate commerce was not a combination in restraint of interstate commerce but simply an intrastate combination in manufacturing. His more serious position was that there
was "nothing in the commerce clause to prevent a State from giving a preference to its inhabitants in the enjoyment of its natural
advantages". Certainly Congress has no power to require private
owners to transport gas in interstate commerce and here the extent to which West Virginia gas was a public utility was entirely
a matter of West Virginia law.
One must agree with Mr. Justice Van Devanter that the
statute was calculated to operate directly in restraint of interstate
commerce in the sense that by the cutting off of a flow of goods
interstate commerce is reduced. Where his reasoning is doubtful
is his characterizing the statute as a regulation of commerce in
the sense that Congress is empowered to regulate commerce and
that without considering its purpose. The statute was not formed
in that character any more than a state statute which gives local
people a preference as to game killed in the state.' Congress could
not force owners to ship their goods in interstate commerce though
it might regulate such shipping when done or migt prohibit it.
That being the case it was a rather pinched view of state autonomy
that considered a state impotent to prefer its citizens in the exploitation of its natural resources. The fact that the volume of
interstate commerce is decreased by state action is a consequence
which does not impair the commerce power of Congress but does
affect its field of application.
Hammer v. Dagentart", the first of the federal child labor
cases, in which a federal statute forbidding the shipment of the
"221 U. S. 229, 31 S. Ct. 564 (1911).
156 U. S. 1, 15 S. Ct. 249 (1895).
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519, 16 S. Ct. 600 (1896).
247 U. S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529 (1918).
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products of child labor in interstate commerce was declared unconstitutional, is available for purposes of contrast. The majority
including Mr. Justice Van Devanter overthrew the statute. Mr.
Justice Holmes dissented. This state of affairs is difficult to
explain so far as Mr. Justice Van Devanter is concerned. Mr.
Justice Holmes would give either the federal or a state legislature
plenty of rope. The possibility that Mr. Justice Van Devanter
was really acting upon his views upon the merits of child labor
legislation looses cast by reason of the fact that he voted with the
'
Court in Sturges v. Beauchamp in which case an Illinois statute
prohibiting child labor in hazardous employments was held valid.
It is noticeable that of all the judges on the Court he is the most
likely to adhere to the majority. He may be expected to dissent
never alone and seldom with others.
V
Probably the most difficult man on the Supreme bench to
estimate in a study of this sort is Mr. Justice McReynolds. One
never knows just when to expect him to dissent. He is, in truth,
He has his own
the most independent dissenter on the bench.'
views and does not hesitate to stand out alone for them. It may
be, and often is, his view that a given case may be disposed of upon
jurisdictional grounds and he proceeds to express himself to that
effect.""
Added to the indefinite characterization that he is a judicial
individualist it appears that he may also fairly be denominated
a believer in the theory sougit to be embodied in the anti-trust
laws; he is, in fact, a "trust-buster," having served as Attorney
General under Wilson. The following remarks taken from his
opinion in the familiar Maple Flooring case" in which trade association activities were held not to violate the anti-trust laws
are suggestive: "It seems to me that ordinary knowledge of human
231 U. S. 320, 34 S. Ct. 60, L. R. A. 1915A, 1196 (1914).
Interesting to observe, however, he filed not a dissenting vote during
the October Term, 1920. See Frankfurter and Illinois, The Business of the
Supreme Court aS Oetober Term, 1929 (1930) 44 HAv. L. REv. 1.
" His dissenting opinion in Pennsylvania v. West V7irginia, supra n. 31,
is an outstanding expression of this tendency. It is a matter of some interest, however, that he concurred in the majority opinion in Frost v. Corporation Com'n., supra n. 52a, when a: splendid means of avoiding consideration
on the merits was at hand, as demonstrated in the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Stone. Notice also his separate opinion in Springer v. Philippine
Islands, 277 U. S. 212, 48 S. Ct. 480 (1928).
80 268 U. S. 563, 587, 45 S. Ct. 578 (1925).
8'
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nature and of the impelling force of greed ought to permit no
serious doubt concerning the ultimate outcome of the arrangements. We may confidently expect the destruction of that kind of
competition long relied upon by the public for the establishment
of fair prices, and to preserve which the Anti-Trust Act was
passed. "
Here he gave play to his unusual faculty for stating a proposition blackest for the view contrary to his own. His admirable
exercise of this talent in his dissenting opinion in Wilson v. New"
must not escape notice at this point. There the Court upheld the
Adamson Act fixing the minimum wages of railway trainmen
for a temporary period in order to avert a threatened nation-wide
strike. Mr. Justice McReynolds declared:
"I have not heretofore supposed that such action (as the
statute here in question) was a regulation of commerce within the
fair intendment of those words as used in the Constitution; and
the argument advanced in support of the contrary view is unsatisfactory to my mind. I cannot, therefor, concur in the conclusion that it is within the power of Congress to enact the
statute.
"But considering the doctrine now affirmed by a majority
of the Court as established, it follows as of course that Congress
has power to fix a maximum as well as a minimum wage for trainmen; to require compulsory arbitration of labor disputes which
may seriously and directly jeopardize the movement of interstate
traffic; and to take measure effectively to protect the free flow of
such commerce against any combination, whether of operatives,
owners, or strangers." 2
91243 U. S. 332, 388-389, 37 S. Ct. 298, L. R. A. 1917E, 938 (1917).

12In Southern Pacific Railway Co. v. Bogert, 250 U. S. 483, 39 S. Ct. 533
(1919) the Supreme Court held that minority stockholders who had been
frozen out entirely by the bondholders and the majority stockholders upon
the reorganization of a Texas railroad company and who had for twenty-fivo
years litigated in vain to overturn the reorganization were entitled upon
finding this the proper remedy, to have a trust impressed upon the stock in
the new company held by the majority stockholder. Mr. Justice McReynolds'
ironical dissent was most effective. Re declared: "Having long emphatically condemned, attacked, and sought without success to annul petitioner's
action, respondents finally come before a court of equity saying in effectAlthough represented by counsel of great eminence we have not heretofore
known the law; notwithstanding all solemnly declared to the contrary, we
now maintain that petitioner was acting for us, our trustee indeed; and we
wish to share in the plan which it has carried to success against our persisThis judicial
tent opposition. Such a claim exhales a very bad odor."
irony is exceeded only by that of Mr. Justice Clarke in the American Column
and Lumber Co. case, supra n. 32.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol37/iss2/4

34

Fordham: The Present Supreme Court, Social Legislation and the Judicial Pr
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
Mr. Justice Van Devanter also dissented in Wilson v. New.
And thus it was the expected thing when he and Mr. Justice
McReynolds concurred in the minimum wage decision in 1923."
Doubtless the vote of the latter in the New case was influenced as
much by his views on social legislation as his conception of the
commerce clause. Certainly it is true that in the great cases involving social legislation upon which the Court has been divided
he has voted with what is known as the conservative majority.'
Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesot °' probably as nearly as any case presents his approach in this field. A Minnesota
statute made it a misdemeanor for buyers of milk to pay less for
it in one locality than another after allowing for transportation
costs to the locality of manufacture or disposal. It was aimed
at the large milk products organizations which by paying high
prices in given communities for a time had been eliminating competing buyers of milk. The Fairmont Creamery Company was
prosecuted for violation of the statute. Mr. Justice Mc:Reynolds
spoke for the Court when the case reached the Supreme Court. He
began by quoting the statute and outlining the course of the
litigation in which exercise he quoted at some length from the
opinion of the state court. He then stated the purpose of the
statute to be the preventing of powerful buyers from paying excessive prices in order to destroy competition. His first score
was the assertion that "enforcement of the statute would amount
to fixing the price at which plaintiff in error may buy, since one
purchase would establish this for all points without regard to
ordinary trade conditions." The real question was whether the
State could for the present purpose prevent plaintiff in error
from carrying on its business as it was wont in a way theretofore
deemed beneficial and not shown to work evil results in the ordinary course of events. Having thus framed the question it was
easy to reach the conclusion that the prohibition of the statute had
no reasonable relation to its object. The Tyson case was quoted to
indicate the invalidity of price-fixing statutes. Mr. Justice
Holmes, Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Stone dissented without opinion.
0

z Supra n. 10.

' Thus he was with the Court in Coppage v. Kansas, supra n. 37; in Tyson
v. Banton, supra n. 14; in Ribnik v. McBride, supra n. 57; and in Williams
v. Standard Oil Co., supra n. 13.
05274 U. S. 1, 47 S. Ct. 596 (1927).
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The majority opinion suggests no inquiry into the background
of the statute. It does not independently discuss the evils at
which the act was directed. It does not consider the question
from the standpoint of whether the legislature might reasonably
have found the means appropriate to the end but finds as a primary judgment in the matter that the means were not reasonably
related to the "anticipated evil". Moreover, the writer of the
opinion places himself between the proverbial Scylla and
Charybdis by attacking the statute as destructive of competitive
conditions. That possibility alone was aside from the point. The
legislature was forced to choose between public regulation and the
destruction of competition by strong buyers if it took no action
since the forces of competition had failed to regulate the situation.
Granting that the statute operated to fix prices that did not conclude the controversy on its merits. (The point, however, brought
the case nicely within the range of past decisions). The Court
seemed more concerned with nominal laissez faire than with some
effective means to place a class of small producers on more even
terms with strong buyers in the bargaining struggle.
In a more recent case Mr. Justice MeReynolds has spoken
more favorably with respect to a statute framed to protect agrarian
interests.
In Liberty Warehouse Company v. Burley Tobacco
Growers Co-operative Marketing Associatime' the Court considered the validity of a Kentucky Statute which made it a crime to induce the breach of the marketing contract of a member of a cooperative marketing association or for a warehouseman knowingly
to permit delivery of goods in violation of such a contract. The
action was brought by a co-operative association for the statutory
penalty for violation of the act by the warehouse company. Jfr.
Justice MeReynolds, for the Court, granted that the act restricted
liberty of contract. But this was done to protect contracts deemed
by the legislature to be of great importance to the public. And
viewed in the light of widespread co-operative marketing legislation elsewhere and the judicial approval thereof it could not be
"8276 U. S. 71, 48 S. Ct. 291 (1928). In Frost v. Corporation Com'n.,
supra n. 52a, however, Mr. Justice McReynolds concurred in a decision overthrowing an Oklahoma statute favoring stock membership co-operative associations by exempting them from the requirement of showing public necessity
to procure a license to do a ginning business. Doubtless he was influenced
by the view that the association was a business corporation in substance and
not a real co-operative out for profit. Cf. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma v. Lowe, supra n. 51, where he concurred in a decision favorable to
the legislation in question.
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said that the restriction upon freedom of contract was beyond the
power of the legislature.
One would suppose that this very fact, that co-operative marketing legislation was so widespread, would certainly make it hard
for a court to overthrow such legislation even though the judges
were disposed against it. But.experience tells a different story.'
It is in matters relating to interstate commerce that it is most
difficult to place Mr. Justice McReynolds. He dissents most unexpectedly. In Frost v. Railroad Commission of California?'we find
him dissenting along with Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice
Brandeis. A California statute providing for the regulation of
transportation for compensation over the public highways of the
state required that a permit and a certificate of convenience and
necessity be obtained from the commission before engaging in such
business. The statute extending to automotive carriers of persons operating under private contracts. The state supreme court
upheld an order requiring Frost et al. to secure a certificate of
public convenience and necessity before continuing to haul fruit
over the public highways for compensation. Here the federal
Supreme Court found the statute an unconstitutional attempt to
convert a private carrier into a common carrier by legislative
fiat and not simply a regulation of the use of public highways.
The opinion was the work of Mr. Justice Sutherland. Mr. Justice
MeReynolds thought that since California had built the roads it
certainly might regulate the use of them even to the extent of
allowing only public intrastate carriers for hire to use them. He
very wisely remarked that "the states are now struggling with
new and enormously difficult problems incident to the growth of
automobile traffic, and we should carefully refrain from interference unless and until there is some real, direct, and material
infraction of rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution"."
"TThus the subsequent adverse decision in Frost v. Corporation Com'n.
went off on the ground that the corporation was a business company out
for profit.
" 271 U. S. 583, 46 S. Ct. 605 (1926).
00 bid, at 271 U. S. 603, in Foster Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U. S. 1,
48 S. Ct. 1 (1928) the Court passed upon the validity of a Louisiana statute
which declgred all shrimp in Louisiana waters to be the property of the state;
forbade the exportation of shrimp from which the heads and shells had not
been removed; but granted the taker such an interest that the shrimp might
be sold within the state; and left the meat after removel of heads and shells
open to sale beyond the confines of the state without restriction. In the
opinion of the Court Mr. Justice Butler found the enactment to lay a direct
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In truth Mr. Justice McReynolds is quite a judicial individualist, whether spontaneously or deliberately so the writer
does not venture to suggest. And he seems to be carrying on the
tradition of some of his famous predecessors on the bench in his
strong attachment to economic individualism. Probably that
feature of his methodolbgy which most distinguishes him from the
other so-called conservatives on the Supreme Court is the exercise
of his ability to formulate questions and propositions in a way
calculated to confound the opposition.
VI
No other- modern jurist looms in such heroic proportions in
the public eye as Ivfr. Justice Holmes. Worthier pens have already
paid fitting tribute to his genius. At this point one looks simply
at his approach in cases involving social legislation.
He has gone farther than any other judge on the present
Court in the application of the classical conception of judicial review. Granting that the function requires tle exercise of judgment by the courts he yet has consistently maintained that such
judgment is distinctly a secondary one. This fact and the general
characteristics of his approach are too well known to require any
extended comment on this occasion. The article, "Mr. Justice
Holmes and the Constitution", by Professor Felix Frankfurter is
a particularly illuminating contribution."
Concerning judicial review the flavor of Mr. Justice Holmes'
judicial utterances suggest a deep-rooted consciousness of the relativity of human opinions and of human values. In reading his
opinions one observes that he does not set out affirmatively to show
the constitutionality of a statute in a given case but goes only so
far as to satisfy himself that the opinion of the legislature in the
matter might reasonably be entertained and is accordingly entitled to judicial respect. Sometimes one feels that his generalizations in this behalf are too broad. Consider the following excerpt from his opinion in Weaver v. Palmer Brothers Company."
burden upon interstate commerce and, of course, found it invalid. He
thought the statute a subterfuge to favor the canning business in Louisiana
and not a measure to retain shrimp for the the use of the people of the
state. Mr. Justice MeReynolds alone dissented. He denied that the record
disclosed any subterfuge and insisted that the state might regulate the sale
and transportation of wild life in ways not permissible with respect to things
subject to absolute ownership.
2w Supra n. 6.

2nSupra n. 25.
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A Pennsylvania statute forbade the use of "shoddy" (a material
the lower quality of which consisted of bits of rags and second
hand garments but the better quality of which was made of new
cloth), whether sterilized or not, in the manufacture of bedding.
The Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional. But 3M1r.
Justice Holmes thought the Court should not interfere. "If the
Legislature of Pennsylvania was of opinion that disease is likely
to be spread by the use of unsterilized shoddy in comfortables I
do not suppose that this Court would pronounce the opinion so
manifestly absurd that it could not be acted upon. If we should
not, then I think that we ought to assume the opinion to be right
for the purpose of testing the law."" This amounts to saying that
the Court should accept the opinion of the legislature as final,
since it asserts that if the legislature thought the statute in question was proper the Court would not declare it too absurd to be
acted upon. This shows with emphasis his disposition to leave
legislative bodies free range in the exercise of their broad powers.
Upon first thought it might be supposed that Mr. Justice
Holmes is a believer in states rights. It would hardly be accurate
to describe him as such in the usual sense of the term, however.
He is not concerned with guaranteeing to the states a preponderant
slice in the distribution of governmental powers. His views are
non-political. His interest lies in keeping courts in their secondary
place in matters of public policyor a political character whether
a challenged statute be a state or a federal enactment. He knows
that courts make law, that their decisions give definite content to
constitutional and statutory generalizations and he is loathe to
abuse the power.' This consciousness explains his rejection of the
now too well established doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, that in matters of so-called general commercial law or general jurisprudence
"-Ibid,at 270 U. S. 415.

1 ,"Law is a statement of the circumstances in which the public force will
be brought to bear upon men through the courts." American Banana Co.
v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S., 347, 356, 29 S. Ct. 511 (1908). See also his
dissenting opinion in Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349, 30 S. Ct.
140 (1910). "The Supreme Court of a state does something more than make
a scientific inquiry outside of and independent of it. It says with an
authority that no one denies except when a citizen of another state is able
to invoke an exceptional jurisdiction that thus the law is and shall be.
Whether it be said to make or to declare the law, it deals with the law of the
state with equal authority, however its function may be described."
Black
and White Taxicab Co. v. Yellow and Brown Taxicab Co., 276 U. S. 518,
535, 48 S. Ct. 404 (1928).
'0 16 Pet. 1, 10 L. ed. 865 (1841).
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state decisions are not controlling upon the federal courts in
adjudicating controversies governed by the common law of a
state.'
His dissent in Hammer v. Dagenhart"' and his majority
opinion in Missouri v. Holland,' the migratory bird case, are
rather convincing evidence of his disposition to grant the federal
government its mite of power.
Holmes opinions are characteristically brief. One wonders
how he frames his noted epigrammatic utterances, philisophical
summaries as it were, upon such small canvasses. He does not
attempt the intensive factual study characteristic of the dissenting
opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis. He is quite aware, however, of
the importance of social data in constitutional law cases. He is
satisfied with the social perspective necessary to the formation of
his own judgment in the matter.
°
Block v. Hirshe
' leaves no doubt as to his emphasis upon the
facts in the decision of constitutional cases. The distressing shortage of housing facilities in Washington during and shortly after
the late war led Congress to provide in the Lever Act for the
regulation of rental rates as well as to permit tenants to hold over
after the expiration of their terms. It was a case of emergency
legislation, pure and simple. In framing the opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice Holmes for once set about showing the affirmative
validity of the statute. He was clear that a change in conditions
may clothe the letting of buildings with a public interest in the
sense of the rule of Munn v. Illinois. "Circumstances may so
change in time or so differ in space as to clothe with such an interest what at other times or in other places would be a matter of
purely private concern.'"'
The circumstances which called forth
this legislation, he was satisfied, supplied the public interest.
That being the case the power to regulate rates, its exercise being
appropriate, was undoubted.
The logic of this reasoning requires that emergency legislation die with the emergency. This Mr. Justice Holmes grants in
the later case of Clwastleton Corporationv. Sinclair"1 involving the
1

6]Kulm v. Fairmont Coal Co., upra n. 103; Black and White Cab Co. v.

Yellow and Brown Cab Co., supra n. 103.
11 Supra n. 86.

252 U. S. 416, 40 S. Ct. 382, 11 A. L. R. 984 (1920).
256 U. S.135, 41 S.Ct. 458, 16 A. L. R. 165 (1921) ; Marcus Brown Co.
v. Feldman, 256 U. S.170, 41 S.Ct. 465 (1921).
1 Supra n. 108, at 256 U. S. 155.

0 264 U. S. 543, 44 S. Ct. 405 (1924).
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same statute as renewed by Congress. "A law depending upon the
existence of an emergency or other certain state of facts to uphold it may cease to operate if the emergency ceases or the facts
change even though valid when passed. "
It would be difficult to imagine a judge less hedged by legalisms than Mr. Justice Holmes. Indisputably he knows all the
tricks of the trade and can write a neat legalistic opinion on occasion. But he does not permit legal phrases any larger place in his
scheme of things than a pocket in his judicial tool box. Results
concern him more than refinements of language. Words have no
more content than one puts into them. Thus to him there is no
peculiar sanctity in the phrase, police power. "The only valuable
significance of the much-abused phrase police power is this power
of the State to limit what otherwise would be rights having a
pecuniary value when a predominant public interest requires the
restraint.' 's
VII
Since this paper entered the preliminary stages of publication
an opinion has been published in a case which indicates the new
alignment on the Court. Speaking through Mr. Justice Brandeis
a majority of five upheld a New Jersey statute limiting commissions of fire insurance brokers to "a reasonable amount" which
should not exceed the commission allowed by a company "to any
one of its local agents on such risks in this state.'"'s Mr. Justice
Brandeis disposed of the case easily on the basis of the New Jersey
- Tbid, at 547-548.
12Frost v. Railroad Com'n., supra n. 98, at 271 U. S. 601. He applies
the same notion to personal interests of a non-pecuniary sort. In Buck v.
Bell, 274 U. S. 200, 47 S. Ct. 584 (1927) the Court upheld a Virginia statute

providing for the sterilization of insane criminals. Mr. Justice Butler voiced
the only dissent.

Speaking for the Court Mr. Justice Holmes went on to

say: "We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon
the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon

those who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices,
often not felt to be so by those concerned, in order to prevent our being
swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if instead of
waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for
their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination
(Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S.11, 25 S. Ct. 358 (1905) is broad
enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes".
O'Gorman and Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 74 L. ed., 162 (decided
Jan. 5, 1931).
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practice which requires the presence of facts in the record sufficient to overcome the presumption of constitutionality in support
of a charge of discrimination where the subject regulated is within
the scope of the police power. He did not find such facts in the
record. Mr. Justice Van Devanter, Mr. Justice McReynolds, Mr.
Justice Sutherland, and Mr. Justice Butler dissented in a joint
opinion. Thus one finds Mr. Justice Roberts voting with the socalled liberal side of the bench and swinging the balance of power
with him.
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